Eliot Spitzer had been governor for less than a month when he addressed a crowd of dignitaries at the state Education Department. The department’s historic building was an appropriate setting for a historic proposal: pumping more money into public education than ever before, in return for more accountability than ever.

The centerpiece of Spitzer’s agenda was a set of performance agreements between the state and needy school districts. Known as Contracts for Excellence, or C4E, these agreements would be linked to more than a quarter of new state aid proposed in the governor’s budget. In return for more money than others, C4E districts would be obligated to implement “proven” programs and be held accountable for the results. C4E was supposed to ensure the efficient and effective use of limited resources to improve educational outcomes. Unfortunately, the program has been seriously hobbled by flaws in its assumptions about the mechanisms of reform, by misguided beliefs about “what works,” and by a compressed timeline for implementation.

C4E could now more accurately stand for “Commitments for Expenditures.” Spitzer’s “contracts” have ended up looking more like a typical government grants program, draped with the jargon of reform. Linkage with performance goals is inconsistent, and there is no mention of what happens to districts that fail to meet the program’s limited input goals.

Spending the $428 million in new state aid is limited to a restrictive “menu of options.” They include: class size reduction, the most popular, with $197 million of the approved funds earmarked for this purpose; “time on task” for pupils in targeted subject areas ($111 million); teacher and principal quality ($57.8 million); school restructuring ($55 million); and kindergarten expansion ($6.6 million). The law allows districts to spend up to 15 percent of their C4E funds on “experimental programs,” but few have taken advantage of the offer. There are significant flaws in the menu, including its failure to acknowledge that successful districts incorporate a host of good programs. As the state School Boards Association has pointed out, “many have questioned the wisdom of having to discontinue innovative programs and replace them with new programs included on the state’s menu of allowable strategies.”

The Education Department guidelines have lengthy sections on research supporting the law’s menu of options, but it is the section most damaged by the rush to implement. For example, given limited resources, the cost-effectiveness of class-size reduction has long been questioned by education researchers.

“Research suggests there may be some advantages to smaller classes – though if so, the benefits are modest and come at a very high price tag,” says Jay Greene, a Manhattan Institute senior fellow and head of the University of Arkansas Department of Education Reform.

Time-on-task strategies, the second most popular option, may include everything from introducing the very successful Reading First literacy program to “individualized tutoring” programs. However, the performance goals are measured on the basis of inputs (such as number of students in a new program) instead of outcomes (such as improvements in reading test scores).

None of the changes the Education Department has announced address the question of real consequences. District “contracts” have been extended to three years; programs for English Language Learners are now included in the menu of options; and schools not making adequate yearly progress are included in the criterion for qualifying for C4E status. The paperwork burden on districts will mount, as the mandatory public hearings must now include a transcript, and a detailed summary of public comments.

This can still be the kind of program New York needs. Here’s how:

Create real contracts, with language spelling out what a district must do to receive its funding and what happens if it does not meet its performance targets.

Eliminate the “menu of options” in favor of an approach that simply requires schools to demonstrate that their strategies have produced results elsewhere.

Require more specific performance targets based on measurable student outcomes.

Expand the program. Covering less than 3 percent of the $20 billion state school aid budget with C4E is a timid nod to accountability.

The ultimate reform implied by Spitzer’s original proposal would be to move the Education Department out of the rule-writing and policing business and into the education accountability business. That will only happen if the department is required to redirect its energies to the task of advising districts on best practices, establishing clear performance outcome targets and enforcing the terms of true contracts.

Peter Meyer is a contributing editor of the Hoover Institution journal Education Next, and a member of the Board of Education in Hudson. This essay is based on a policy briefing from the Empire Center for Public Policy.